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Proving the Obvious: The Antitrust Laws
Were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not
Just to Increase Efficiency)
by
ROBERT H. LANDE*

Sometimes an entire field goes astray. When its dominant
members make a major mistake, an opportunity arises for someone to
say, "The emperor has no clothes." This is what happened to the
antitrust world during much of the 1970s and 1980s. These
circumstances gave me the opening and motivation to write the article
that appeared in the Hastings Law Journal in 1982 (Wealth Transfers
as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust: The Efficiency
Interpretation Challenged, hereafter Wealth Transfers).!
In the early 1980s, the Chicago School was firmly in control of
the antitrust world. The heads of both federal enforcement agencies
were proud disciples, as were an increasing number of federal judges.
All based their beliefs upon the Chicago School idea that only one
value was an allowable goal of antitrust policy. As explained by thenProfessor Robert Bork, a leading Chicago School theorist, "antitrust
policy cannot be made rational until we are able to give a firm answer
to one question: What is the point of the law-what are its goals?

* Venable Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. The author is
grateful to Neil W. Averitt, Albert A. Foer and James D. Hurwitz for extremely helpful
suggestions and to Elise Balkin and Kelly Phillips for excellent research assistance. All
remaining errors are the author's.
1. See Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 Hastings L.J. 65 (1982). This article
grew out of an early assignment I received as a member of the Planning Office of the
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission in 1978. My boss, Jack
Kirkwood, described an earlier view of antitrust based upon social and political values, a
distrust of the political power of big business, and a love of small business. He also
explained how it was being replaced by the nascent Chicago School view that the sole goal
of antitrust was to enhance economic efficiency. He asked me to read the original
legislative histories of the antitrust laws and determine which view was correct. My report,
an internal Planning Office document, was finished in January 1979. As shown by the
final form of my research, printed in the Hastings Law Journal, neither view was correct.
[959]

960

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

Everything else follows from the answer we give."2 During the
Reagan administration the federal enforcers, leading scholars, and
many judges gave a one word answer to Bork's question: efficiency.
Bork not only supplied the question; he was also the original and
primary source of its answer.
He had performed a "strict
constructionist" view of the antitrust laws' legislative history. In a
famous 1966 law review article, he analyzed the legislative history of
the Sherman Act and appeared to demonstrate how, when Congress
debated and passed the Sherman Act, it had only one concern:
increased economic efficiency.3 Bork made an apparently convincing
argument that all other possible goals of the antitrust laws were, if the
legislative debates were analyzed closely, irrelevant.4
In particular, Judge Bork examined the older "populist" views of
antitrust-the belief that the antitrust laws were passed to further a
variety of social and political goals, such as combating the political
power of big business. He asserted that, while social and political
values might have motivated Congress to act, when it came down to
the operation of the actual laws, Congress cared only about increasing
the efficiency of our economy.5
Bork also argued that only an efficiency orientation was
administrable. He made a convincing case that even if there was any
doubt as to Congressional intent-he, of course, had none-the
antitrust laws should be construed in an administrable manner. Since
a social-political framework was so amorphous, he argued,
administrability concerns also militated that the antitrust laws should
be interpreted solely as a means of increasing economic efficiency.
Indeed, Bork even pronounced all contrary views as being so
incapable of use as to be "unconstitutional."6
It should be emphasized that Bork went far beyond arguing that
the best antitrust policy was one concerned only with efficiency.
After all, reasonable people could disagree over which policy was
optimal. Bork sought to trump what others thought of his efficiencyoriented policy view with his historical analysis and "strict
The only question, he correctly
constructionist" argument.
maintained, is what Congress cared about. And he seemed to
demonstrate that it cared only about increasing economic efficiency.
By making a legislative history argument rather than a "here's
2. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
50 (1978).
3. See Robert Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. &
ECON. 7 (1966).
4. See id. passim.
5. See id. passim.
6. Robert H. Bork, The Role of the Courts in Applying Economics, 54 ANTITRUST
L.J. 21, 24 (1985).
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what is best" argument, Bork vastly raised the stakes. If he could
freeze the argument over the goals of the antitrust laws through an
analysis of their legislative histories he would win the argument not
just while the Reaganites were in power, but for all time. But his
approach ultimately led to his undoing.
Wealth Transfers demonstrated that Bork was wrong?
The
Article analyzed the legislative histories of the antitrust laws and
showed that Congress' primary concern actually was with protecting
consumers from paying more as a result of anticompetitive activity.
Congress condemned cartel pricing because it transferred wealth
from consumers to the cartel. Congress was not even aware that
supracompetitive pricing leads to economic inefficiency.8 (Indeed,
the inefficiency effects of supracompetitive pricing are complex.9
This makes it difficult to distinguish the inefficiency and wealth
transfer effects of market power, and helped enable Bork's argument
to succeed.1°)
Wealth Transfers demonstrated that the antitrust laws were
intended to be, and are best viewed as, a type of consumer protection
statute. While the Congresses that passed the antitrust laws also had
additional goals-including greater economic efficiencylL-these
legislatures' overriding concern was that consumers should not have
7. See Lande, supra note 1.
8. See id. at 86-89.
9. Supracompetitive pricing not only forces consumers to pay more. It also causes a
form of economic inefficiency:
To raise prices a monopoly reduces output from the competitive level. The goods
no longer sold are worth more to would-be purchasers than they would cost
society to produce. This foregone production of goods worth more than
their cost is pure social loss and constitutes the "allocative inefficiency" of
monopoly. For example, suppose that widgets cost $1.00 in a competitive
market (their cost of production plus a competitive profit). Suppose a
monopolist would sell them for $2.00. A potential purchaser who would
have been willing to pay up to $1.50 will not purchase at the $2.00 level.
Since a competitive market would have sold the widgets for less than they
were worth to him, the monopolist's reduced production has decreased the
consumer's satisfaction without producing any countervailing benefits for
anyone. This pure loss is termed "allocative inefficiency." For an extended
discussion and formal proof that monopoly pricing creates allocative
inefficiency, see E. MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: THEORY AND
th
APPLICATIONS 277-92 (4 ed.1982).
Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Rule of Antitrust, 33
ANTITRUST BULL. 429, 433-34 n.17 (1988).
10. Bork argued that the antitrust laws were concerned with "consumer welfare," a
term that he defined as having nothing to do with the welfare of consumers! Most
economists define "total welfare" as the sum of producer welfare and consumer welfare.
Bork used "consumer welfare" when he should have used "total welfare." See discussion
in Lande, supra note 9. at 433-35.
11. See Lande, supra note 1, at 83-93,108-112,131-35,142-150.
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to pay prices above the competitive level. All other goals were
subordinated to this concem.12
In later research I followed up on and extended the Hastings
article's themes in two fundamental ways. The first was to consider
what differences would arise if the wealth transfer goal were
incorporated into substantive antitrust analysis. Wealth Transfers
presented, as an example, an eight page explanation of the differences
that would arise if one changed the fundamental question asked in
merger analysis.13 Instead of asking, "is the merger likely to be
efficient," the Article asked, "is the merger likely to lead to higher
consumer prices?" The Hastings article contained only a limited
assessment of this issue.
The complex economic analysis necessary to answer this question
more completely required the collaboration of three excellent
economists, Drs. Alan Fisher, Frederick Johnson, and Walter
Vandaele. Relying on their rigorous economic insights, we examined
in detail how merger enforcement would differ if the wealth transfer
effects of mergers, in addition to their efficiency effects, were
incorporated into merger analysis.14 This series of articles showed
that the wealth transfer thesis was not just theoretical; it offered a
concrete approach that readily could be implemented. These articles
also showed that a wealth transfer view of antitrust is at least as easy
to administer as an efficiency view.15 Moreover, the articles
demonstrate that some mergers that would be tolerated under a pure
efficiency approach should nevertheless be blocked since they would
prove costly to consumers.16
The second issue broached in the Hastings article that I have
since pursued concerns the implications of incorporating into antitrust
analysis some dimension of consumer welfare other than higher
prices. Society's primary fear is that market power might lead to
higher prices for consumers. But consumers want many things from
the economy, in addition to competitively priced goods, including

12 See id. passim and 150-51.
13. See id. at 142-50.
14. See Alan A. Fisher et aI., Price Effects of Horizontal Mergers, 77 CAL. L. REV. 777
(1989) (co-authored with Dr. Alan Fisher and Dr. Frederick Johnson) [hereinafter Price
Effects] reprinted in 21 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 471 (1991), in 32 CORP.
PRAC. COMMENTATOR 153 (1990), and in ELEANOR M. FOX & JAMES T. HALVERSON,
COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMICS 361402 (1991); Alan A. Fisher et aI., Afterword: Could a Merger Lead to Both a Monopoly
and a Lower Price?, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1697 (1983) (co-authored with Dr. Alan A. Fisher
and Dr. Walter Vandaele); Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande, Efficiency Considerations
in Merger Enforcement, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1580 (1983).
15. See Price Effects, supra note 14, at 809-13.
16. See id. at 815-18.
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optimal levels of quality, variety, and safety.
The Hastings article presented a five-page frameworkdeveloped together with a Federal Trade Commission colleague, Neil
W. Averitt-that considered how market power might be considered
anticompetitive when it interfered with price or non-price l7 aspects of
consumer choice. IS Using this framework we also defined and
distinguished antitrust and consumer protection violations. We
concluded that antitrust violations (such as price fixing) interfere with
the choices available on the market; whereas consumer protection
violations (such as false advertising) interfere with consumers' ability
to make an informed choice among the options presented by the
marketplace.19
In recent years, Mr. Averitt and I developed the consumer choice
approach considerably beyond its 1982 incarnation.20 We showed
how it would make a difference in a significant number of antitrust
situa tions.21
In the seventeen years since the publication of the Hastings
Article, the "wealth transfer" thesis has achieved substantial
recognition in both the academic literature and the academy. It has
been cited at least 240 times in law review articles22 and at least
17. Many seemingly "non-price" variables can be expressed in price terms. A loss of
product variety or quality due to a merger, for example, might sometimes be offset by a
lower price to consumers. See Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST
LJ. 713,750-53 (1997).
18. See Lande, supra note 1 at 121-26. The wealth transfer piece uses a traditional,
economically-oriented cost/price based approach. For many purposes this fully captures
all that may be wrong with anticompetitive activity. A particular merger, for example,
would often be undesirable solely because it leads to higher prices for consumers. The
"consumer choice" approach extends the wealth transfer approach into areas where more
than price is important.
19. See id.
20. The first of these articles, Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Sovereignty: A Unified Theory of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 65 ANTITRUST
LJ. 713 (1997) won the Federal Trade Commission's 1998 award for best published
scholarship of the previous year. See also Neil W. Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Consumer
Choice: The Practical Reason For Both Antitrust And Consumer Protection Law, 10 LOy.
CONSUMER L. REV. 44 (1998); Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Unifying Goal
of Antitrust and Consumer Protection Law, 14 NIHON U.COMP. LAW 131 (1997).
21. For example, if a merger involves media companies, a choice approach might be
especially important since consumer welfare in this area cannot be measured solely by
price/cost margins. The postmerger variety of media viewpoints would also be important.
See Averitt & Lande, supra note 17 at 752-53.
22. Search of Westlaw, Law Review Citations, Shepard's 1986 Bound Volume through
September 1999 Supplement (September 30,1999) (retrieving 170 citations) and Westlaw,
EZ Access Search for cases, statutes, Annotated Law Reports, or other types of
documents, Texts & Periodicals - All (September 21, 1999) (retrieving 215 citations).
Many citations were listed by both sources and were only counted once. This search is,
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seventeen times in economics and business journalsP The article has
been reprinted in part four times24 (not including the republication in
this volume). Its thesis has been presented in revised and condensed
forms three times, and these versions have themselves been reprinted
three additional times.25 It has been cited in at least seven antitrust
textbooks and other books designed for the classroom.26 Among the
antitrust scholars who have agreed with its fundamental assertion that
wealth transfers should count in antitrust analysis are Professors
Areeda,21 Carstensen,28 Farmer,29 Flynn,3o FOX,31 Grimes,32 Harris,33
however, incomplete, since several law review articles not listed also cite the article.
23. INST. FOR SCIENTIFIC INFo., SOCIAL SCIENCES INDEX (1982-97).
24. The Article was excerpted in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE SHERMAN ACT:
THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED YEARS 71-84 (E. Thomas Sullivan ed., 1991); in E. THOMAS
SULLIVAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW, POLICY AND PROCEDURE:
CASES, MATERIALS, PROBLEMS at 15-23 in 1989 edition, and at 14-22 in 1994 edition, in
19 J. REPRINTS FOR ANTITRUST L. & ECON. 159-83 (1989); and in AN ANTITRUST
ANTHOLOGY 50-53 (Andrew I. Gavil, ed., 1996).
25. Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of
Antitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 (1988) (translated into Porteguese and reprinted in 23
Revista de Direito Economico 39 (1996) (Brazil), reprinted in ELEANOR M. FOX AND
JAMES I. HALVERSON, COLLABORATIONS AMONG COMPETITORS: ANTITRUST POLICY
AND ECONOMICS 105-30 (1991)); Robert H. Lande, Chicago's False Foundation: Wealth
Transfers (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide Antitrust, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 631 (1989),
reprinted in F.M. SCHERER, MONOPOLY AND COMPETITION POLICY VOLUME 1241 (1993);
Robert H. Lande, Just Where does Judge Bork Stand?-An Anti-Antitrust Activitst?
NAT'LL.J. Sept. 7, 1987, at 13.
26. E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 4 n.3 (3d ed. 1998); PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS
KApLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, AND CASES 44 n.12 (5th ed. 1997);
ERNEST GELLHORN & WILLIAM E. KOVACIC, ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A
NUTSHELL 21 (4th ed. 1994); THOMAS D. MORGAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
MODERN ANTITRUST LAW AND ITS ORIGINS 24 n.20 (1994); STEPHEN F. ROSS,
PRINCIPLES OF ANTITRUST LAW 5 n.l0 (1993); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS
AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 50 n.3 (Lawyer's Edition 1985); HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAw50 n.3 (Student Edition
1985).
27. See PHILLIP AREEDA & LOUIS KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 44, 50 (5th ed.
1997); Phillip Areeda, Introduction to Antitrust Economics, 52 ANTITRUST L.J. 523, 536
(1983). By contrast, in 1980 Professor Areeda appeared to endorse the view that
economic efficiency should be the only factor in antitrust analysis. See 4 P. AREEDA & D.
TuRNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATIONS
149 n.2 (1980).
28. See Peter C. Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on the American
Economy: Examining History or Theorizing?, 74 IOWA L. REv. 1175, 1216-17 (1989).
29. See E-mail from Beth Farmer, to Robert Lande (March 15, 1999) (on file with the

Hastings Law Journal).
30. See Flynn, Antitrust Policy and the Concept of a Competitive Process, 35 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REv. 893, 910, 911 n.58 (1990).
31. See Eleanor M. Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision
Making: Antitrust As A Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 554, 563, 567 (1986). See also E-mail
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Hovenkamp,34 Jorde,35 Kaplow,36 Kovacic,37 Krattenmaker,38 Lao,39
May,40 Patterson,41 Peritz,42 Ponsoldt,43 ROSS,44 Salop,45 Sullivan,46
Waller,47 and Wiley.48 Even respected analysts normally associated
with the Chicago school, including Judges Easterbrook49 and

from Eleanor M. Fox, letter to Robert Lande (March 15, 1999) (on file with the Hastings
Law Journal).
32. See Warren S. Grimes, When Do Franchisors Have Market Power? Antitrust
Remedies for Franchisor Opportunism, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 105, 126 (1996).
33. See Robert G. Harris & Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An
Integrated Approach, 72 CAL. L. REv. 1, 14-16 (1984).
34. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy After Chicago, 84 MICH. L. REv. 213,
250,251 (1985).
35. See Harris & Jorde, supra note 33, at 14-16.
36. See Louis Kaplow, The Accuracy of Traditional Market Power Analysis and a
Direct Adjustment Alternative, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1817, 1822-23 (1982).
37. See William E. Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the
Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1413, 1462-63 (1990).
38. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion:
Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE LJ. 209, 279-80 (1986).
39. See E-mail from Marina Lao, to Robert Lande (April 5, 1999) (on file with the
Hastings Law Journal).
40. See James May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional and Antitrust Analysis 1880-1918, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 257, 260 n.15, 288 n.269,
and 11 other footnotes (1989). See also E-mail from James May, to Robert Lande (March
16,1999) (on file with the Hastings Law Journal).
41. See E-mail from Mark Patterson, to Robert Lande (March 16, 1999) (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal).
42. See Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263,
281,282,314.
43. See John J. Flynn & James F. Ponsoldt, Legal Reasoning and the Jurisprudence of
Vertical Restraints: The Limitations of Neoclassical Economic Analysis in the Resolution of
Antitrust Disputes, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1125,1137, 1138,1147 (1987).
44. See Stephen F. Ross, The Misunderstood Alliance Between Sports Fans, Players,
and the Antitrust Laws, 1997 U. ILL. L. REv. 519, 530-31 (1997); Antitrust Implications of
the Recent NFL Television Contract: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 4561 (1987) (statement of Stephen F. Ross).
45. See Krattenmaker & Salop, supra note 38, at 279-80.
46. See E. Thomas Sullivan, The Economic Jurisprudence of the Burger Court's
Antitrust Policy: The First Thirteen Years, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1 (1982); The
Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An Enforcement Policy In Transition, 64
WASH. u. L.Q. 997, 999 n.2, 1054 n.267 (l986).
47. See E-mail from Spencer Waller, to Robert Lande (March 15, 1999) (on file with
the Hastings Law Journal).
48. See John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Revision and Apology in Antitrust Federalism, 96
YALE L.J. 1277, 1283, 1284 n.32, (1987); John Shepard Wiley, Jr., Antitrust and Core
Theory, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 556, 587 n. 109 (1987); John Shpard Wiley, Jr., A Capture
Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARv. L. REv. 713, 749 n.165 (1986); "After Chicago
An Exaggerated Demise?, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1003, 1011, 1012 n.38.
49. Judge Easterbrook, long a stalwart of the Chicago School, wrote that when
Congress passed the Sherman Act: "The choice they saw was between leaving consumers
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Ginsburg,50 and Congressman Campbell,5l appear to have accepted it.
It has also been accepted by the current government antitrust
enforcers-the National Association of Attorneys General,52 the
Department of Justice Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade
Commission.53
The article has not, however, been widely cited by the courts. It
apparently has been cited only three times by federal courts54 and
twice by state courts,55 though there might be other decisions that
utilize its logic without citing it.
There is often a considerable gap between the time an idea is
promulgated and the time it reaches the courts. Nevertheless, it is
possible that the Article's thesis is too theoretical to be of much
interest to judges. After all, if a merger leads to higher prices for
consumers it usually does not matter whether we condemn that
merger because of the wealth that it transfers from consumers to a
resulting monopolist, or because of the allocative inefficiency caused
by the supracompetitive pricing.56 Conversely, if no market power is
at the mercy of trusts and authorizing the judges to protect consumers. However you slice
the legislative history, the dominant theme is the protection of consumers from
overcharges." Frank H. Easterbrook, Workable Antitrust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1696,
1702-03 (1986). Easterbrook then asserted: "This turns out to be the same program as one
based on 'efficiency.' There are differences at the margins ... but the differences are not
very important." Id. at 1703. Judge Easterbrook appears to agree that Congress wanted
antitrust to count wealth transfers, but disagrees with Bork over the importance of
determining the correct goals of the antitrust laws.
50. Judge Ginsburg, an Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust under President
Reagan, noted:
Particularly in view of the infrequency with which efficiency showings can
convincingly be made on behalf of a proposed merger, a price-driven standard
for mergers would do more to avoid lost efficiencies through over-enforcement
(of the Von's, Brown, or PNB sort) than could possibly be lost by the occasional
blocking of a merger that would be both price and efficiency enhancing.
Letter from Judge Douglas H. Ginsburg to Robert H. Lande (Feb. 3, 1988).
51. See Thomas J. Campbell, Has Economics Rationalized Antitrust?, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 607, 617 (1983) (focusing largely upon the Robinson-Patman Act).
52. See 1993 Horizontal Merger Guidelines of the National Ass'n of Atty Generals,
CCH Trade Reg. Reports No. 256, March 30, 1993, at Section 2.
53. See Revision to Section 4 of Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 72 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 359, April 8, 1997.
54. See Pashall v. Kansas City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 701 n.9 (8th Cir. 1984);
Consolidated Metal Prods., Inc. v. American Petroleum Inst., 846 F.2d 284, 293 n.26 (5th
Cir. 1988);. See also Judge Wald's concurrence to Judge Bork's opinion in Rothery
Storage & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, 792 F.2d 210, 231 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Wald, J.,
concurring), discussed in Robert H. Lande, The Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency As
The Ruler ofAntitrust, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 429 ,457 (1988).
55. See Redwood Theatres, Inc. v. Festival Enters., Inc., 200 Cal. App. 3d 687,709 n.ll
(1988); Abbott Lab. v. Durrett, 1999 WL 424338 at *37 n. (Ala. June 25, 1999).
56. For an explanation of these differences see articles cited in note 14, supra, and
Lande, supra note 1, at 142-50.
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likely to be created, the merger is innocuous under either view of
antitrust.
There are, however, times when it does matter whether an
efficiency or wealth transfer orientation is used in antitrust.57 By
analogy, the flat earth model is a surprisingly good model for most
everyday purposes. The earth curves on the average only about eight
inches per mile,58 so if we assume that the earth is flat we will only be
wrong by an average of eight inches per mile. An architect designing
a building, for example, can safely ignore the earth's curvature.
But sometimes those eight inches per mile add to a significant
figure. And, it is nice to know the true shape of the earth for truth's
own sake.
It is similarly important to know why we have the antitrust laws.
They were passed to protect consumers. That was the message of my
1982 article.
Wealth Transfers was published while the Chicago School was
tightening its grip on the antitrust world. Although no piece of
scholarship could have reversed that historical tidal wave, Wealth
Transfers did help contribute to a post-Chicago antitrust renaissance
by delegitimizing a fundamental part of the Chicago School's
foundation,59 and opening up a space in which a post-Chicago
renaissance could grow.
This theme is at least as important today. The notion that the
antitrust laws are consumer protection laws was, during the Reagan
era, an idea ahead of its time. But now that the political climate has
changed and we are in the middle of a post-Chicago antitrust
renaissance60 the antitrust world is ripe for truly consumer-oriented
57. For examples, see Fisher, et aI., supra note 14 passim; Lande, supra note 9, at 463.
58. The earth has a radius of approximately 3,963 miles at the equator. See
COMPARISONS OF DISTANCE, SIZE, AREA, VOLUME, MASS, WEIGHT, DENSITY, ENERGY,
TEMPERATURE, TIME, SPEED AND SUMBER THROUGHOUT THE UNIVERSE at 50 (1980).
Imagine a line drawn perpendicular to its radius that is one mile long. The length of the
remaining segment of a right triangle that would connect up the earlier two segments
would be the square root of (3,963 squared plus 1 squared), which equals the square root
of 15,705,370) which equals 3,963.000126 miles. A mile contains 5,280 x 12 = 63,360 inches.
Multiplying 63,360 times this difference of .000126 equals 7.99 inches.
59. See Robert H. Lande, Beyond Chicago: Will Activist Antitrust Arise Again?,39
ANTITRUST BULL. 1 (1994) [hereinafter Lande, Beyond Chicago.] A short version of the
Hastings article appeared in the National Law Journal just before the vote on Judge
Bork's Supreme Court nomination. See Robert H. Lande, Just Where does Judge Bork
Stand?-An Anti-Antitrust Activist?, NAT'L LJ. Sept 7, 1987, at 13. This piece
demonstrated that Judge Bork was a "strict constructionist" only when it suited his aims,
but not at other times, such as when he interpreted the intent underlying the antitrust
laws. The role of the Hastings thesis in the Senate's rejection of his nomination for the
Supreme Court, however, is analogous to adding a spoonful of water to the Mississippi
River and then attempting to trace the effects of that spoonful on subsequent events.
60. See Lande, Beyond Chicago, supra note 59 passim. See also the web site of the
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antitrust laws. For this reason the Article's influence might well be
even greater in the future.
With the advantage of hindsight the "wealth transfer" thesis was
obvious, and it is sometimes difficult for me to believe that the article
was ever necessary. But it was. And it still is. For this reason I am
especially honored and delighted that the Hastings Law Journal has
decided to republish it.

American Antitrust Institute <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org>, a public interest
consumer-oriented group founded in 1998 with the goal of helping to lead a post-Chicago
revitalization of antitrust. This organization endorses the belief that an important reason
why the antitrust laws were passed was to protect consumers from unfair transfers of
wealth to firms engaging in anticompetitive activity.

